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The vast expansion of international ￿ nancial activity over the last decade has been
a central fact of internationaleconomic life. Balance-of-paymentsstatistics indicate
that cross-border transactions in bonds and equities among the G-7 countries rose
from less than 10 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) in 1980 to over 140
percent in 1995.
1 International bond and equity markets have reached staggering
proportions: by the end of 1997, portfolio holdings of equity and long-term debt
securities reached nearly $5.2 trillion.
2 Capital ￿ ows to developing countries and
countries in transition grew from $57 billion in 1990 to over $286 billion in 1997
before plummeting to $148 billion in 1998.
3 Foreign exchange transactions reached
an estimated average daily turnover of nearly $1.5 trillion in 1998 compared with a
daily turnover of $590 billion in 1989.
4 The annual turnover in derivatives con-
tracts—￿ nancial agreements that derive their value from the performance of other
assets, interest or currency exchange rates, or indexes—was valued at $3.4 trillion
in 1990.
5 In 1998, trading and derivatives activities of seventy-one of the world’s
leading banks and securities ￿ rms totaled more than $130 trillion.
6
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© 2001 by The IO Foundation and the Massachusetts Institute of TechnologyGlobal capital markets pose dilemmas for national ￿ nancial regulators. On the
one hand, ￿ nancial liberalization and the removal of capital controls calls for the
sophisticated “re-regulation” of capital markets.
7 Liberalization has increased com-
petition in banking, which in turn has encouraged some ￿ rms to take on more risk.
Innovative ￿ nancial instruments and strategies and accounting and reporting stan-
dards that are dif￿cult to compare across jurisdictions have compromised transpar-
ency. As capital controls have been lifted, the opportunity to use international
markets for illicit activities has increased.
8 On the other hand, national regulatory
authoritiesare ￿ nding it increasinglydif￿cult to achievetheirpurposes unilaterally.
9
The speed with which internationaltransactionstake place, the complex structure of
many ￿ nancial contracts, and the multi-country network of branches and af￿ liates
through which these transactions pass often impede efforts of nationalauthoritiesto
properly supervise and regulate ￿ nancial markets. Competitive concerns are also
important. As in other areas of economic activity, national regulators typically
prefer to avoid rules that raise costs for national ￿ rms or that encourage capital or
￿ nancial activity to migrate to underregulated jurisdictions.
Efforts to coordinate national policies for regulating speci￿c aspects of interna-
tional capital markets have cropped up repeatedly since the mid-1980s. They have
varied in their degree of politicizationand mode of institutionalization. I provide a
framework to explain such variation, focusing especially on the mechanisms that
encourage convergence across various areas of ￿ nancial regulation. Many of our
traditional theories are not especially well suited to explaining this variation.
Theories of “races to the bottom,” for example, are of little help. They suggest that
mobile capital will lead to competition in regulatory laxity across national jurisdic-
tions, as governments vie for footloose capital, try to attract ￿ nancial business, and
attempt to grant competitive advantages to national ￿ rms. The predicted result is
market-induced downward pressures on regulatory standards. It is dif￿cult, how-
ever, to reconcile this simple competitive mechanism with the general tighteningof
regulatory standards in a number of areas. Capital adequacy requirements for banks
provides one example.
Nor are prevalent theories of cooperation very useful in explaining the variance
we see in the role and strength of international institutions in this area. If interna-
tional institutionsare created to reduce uncertaintyand transactionscosts,
10 why are
they much less developed in the regulation of ￿ nancial markets than in trade?
According to this argument, the volatility and volume of transactions should make
￿ nancial regulation a good candidate for institutionalization. But cooperative ar-
rangements to create common capital market regulations are far less formal,
comprehensive, and inclusive than those for trade.
7. Cerny 1993.
8. Strange 1996.
9. For a summary of the basic purposes of ￿nancial regulation, see Herring and Litan 1995, 50.
10. Keohane 1984.
590 International OrganizationFinally, contrary to arguments that underlie neoliberal institutionalism, the
internationalarrangements that have developedare not uniformly Pareto-superior to
uncoordinated national policies. Some governments have resisted “harmonized”
regulations precisely because within their jurisdiction the costs exacted from such
regulationsare higher than the bene￿ts conferred. In some cases, harmonizationhas
been coerced; in others it has been the best available response to a changed
regulatoryenvironmentoverwhich smaller jurisdictionstypicallyhave littlecontrol.
Theories that rest on joint gains will seriously misspecify the mechanisms at work
in these cases.
Many aspects of international regulatory harmonization are worthy of explana-
tion. One could ask, for example, whether harmonization is likely at all or whether
it is moving “up” toward more rigorous standards or “down” toward greater laxity.
I address these questions only indirectly. My primary focus is on the mechanisms
that drive regulatory harmonization in international ￿ nance. Just as we would like
to know whether ￿ rms have arrived at similar prices for a good through collusionor
competition, we want to know whether harmonization occurs through political or
market pressures. My argument also informs a discussion about whether interna-
tional institutions will play a role in the process of harmonization, and if so, what
that role will be. In short, the dependent variable of this study is primarily
harmonization processes.
11 By focusing on process mechanisms, I provide a
theoretical and practical explanation of the relative roles of market incentives,
political pressure, and multilateral institutions in the coordination of regulatory
policies.
I propose a simple framework that focuses on strategic interactions between a
dominant “regulatory innovator” and the rest of the ￿ nancial world. Regulatory
innovation in the dominant ￿ nancial center is taken as exogenous; however, the
dominant regulator does have to think strategically about how foreign regulators
react to its innovation.I argue that explanationsfor how harmonization unfolds fall
into two dimensions: (1) the incentives other regulators face to emulate or diverge
from the regulatory innovation of the dominant ￿ nancial center, and (2) the nature
and extent of the externalities produced by this reaction, as experienced in or
anticipated by the dominant center. Within these two dimensions we can explain
outcomes that vary across issue areas in ￿ nance, whether harmonization will be
economically or politically induced, and the role, if any, played by international
institutions in the process.
The framework implies that most of the regulatoryharmonizationthat occurred in
the 1980s and 1990s was not “cooperative”; it resulted less from mutual adjustment
than from unilateral decisions imposed by the dominant ￿ nancial centers on other
jurisdictions. The decisions of regulators in the dominant centers can drastically
change the choicesavailableto other countries;they create a paradigmaticshift, and
any negotiations that follow are merely splitting hairs. This does not mean that the
11. The focus here is not to explain the speci￿ c content of regulatory regimes.
International Politics of Harmonization 591United States, the United Kingdom, or even the G-10 countries always easily
achieve their preferred regulatory outcome worldwide, for, as I argue, other
jurisdictions may have negative reaction functions that cause them to choose
divergent regulatory trajectories. In these cases, harmonization is unlikely without
political pressure from the dominant ￿ nancial centers. Under these conditions
multilateral institutions are created to enhance political pressure.
The article is organized as follows. I ￿ rst outline the basic argument and then
provide evidence to show that in four issue areas illustrative of the variation in the
two key explanatory variables (incentives to emulate and the nature and extent of
externalities) the mechanisms of harmonization broadly accord with the expecta-
tions of the framework. I offer conclusions in the ￿ nal section.
Harmonizing International Capital Market Regulations
The Nature of International Finance
Efforts over the past decade to coordinate the regulation of internationally active
￿ nancial entities have been diverse and ad hoc. There is neither a single venue nor
a unitary process for hammering out a regime for regulating international capital
markets. No “world capital organization” parallels the World Trade Organization,
nor have internationalrules been approached comprehensively,as was the case with
the Law of the Seas during the 1970s. In fact, legally binding conventions for the
international ￿ nancial sector are rare (outside of Europe). Rule development has
tended to involve small numbers of national regulators or supervisors, working
brie￿y but intensively on relatively narrow issues, and producing nonbinding
agreements. Arguably, the very nature of international￿ nance has necessitatedsuch
an approach. Formal, protracted negotiations would be rapidly overtaken by tech-
nological change, ￿ nancial innovation, and other market developments. Rapid
changes in ￿ nancial markets undercut the value of detailed, legally binding agree-
ments that take time to ratify and implementlegislatively.Overall, ￿ nancialmarkets
are swiftly moving targets whose supervision and regulation require streamlined
decision making and a tremendous amount of technical expertise.
Finance is distinctin anotherway as well: few other areas of internationalactivity
are so profoundly dominated by only one or two countries. The United States and
the United Kingdom dominate international ￿ nancial issues by virtue of the size,
ef￿ ciency, and internationalization of their markets and the sophistication of their
regulatory structures. This dominance, in turn, is driven by the special role of the
dollar and the pound sterling in internationaltrade as well as by the extent to which
￿ rms from the United States and the United Kingdom engage in trade and foreign
direct investment. Some 85 percent of world foreign exchange transactions involve
the U.S. dollar, a preeminence that does not yet seem to be challenged by the euro.
Moreover, ￿ rms headquartered in the United States and the United Kingdom
592 International Organizationaccounted for 45 percent of total OECD foreign direct investment in￿ows and 38
percent of out￿ows in the 1990s.
12
Finance is big business in both countries. The ￿ nancial sector accounts for about
14 percent of U.S. GDP, or about $1.3 trillion in 1998.
13 The private bankingsector
in the United States provided domestic credit equal to 162 percent of GDP in 1998.
Only Switzerland’s banking sector provided a higher ratio (177 percent) but for a
much smaller GDP base (the average ￿ gure for high-income countries was 140
percent of GDP).
14 Institutional investors mobilize more assets in the United States
and the United Kingdom than anywhere else on the globe: In the United States the
ratio of these assets to GDP is 170 percent, and in the United Kingdom the ratio is
162 percent. These ￿ gures compare with 77, 75, and 46 percent respectively for
Japan, France, and Germany.
15 A spate of bank mergers in the late 1990s left the
United States with three of the six largest internationallyactive banks in the world
by market capitalization.
16 More importantly, however, these two countries are the
prime centers in which foreign ￿ nancial institutions conduct business. The biggest
foreign banks in the world keep more assets in the United States and the United
Kingdom than anywhere else.
17 London is the most highly internationalized ￿ nan-
cial center in the world, with over 550 internationalbanks and 170 global securities
houses.
The United States and the United Kingdom are also heavyweightsin the ￿ nancial
component of international trade. Together, they exported on average during the
1990s $12.6 billion of ￿ nancial services,
18 only slightly less than the total for the
rest of the OECD countries combined. The United States was the second largest
importer of ￿ nancial services in the OECD as well (with average imports of $2.74
billion), second only to Italy (with $3.9 billion) and far ahead of third-place Japan
($1.57 billion).
19 Banks from the United States and the United Kingdom are also at
the center of the interbank payments system: together they account for nearly half
of all intra-G-10 message ￿ ows between ￿ nancial institutions for purposes of
12. Thomsen 2000, 6.
13. The most speci￿ c disaggregation of the service sector conventionally available includes ￿ nance,
insurance, and real estate (FIRE). See U.S. Department of Commerce 1998, tab. 601c, line 16. Available
at ^http://www.lib.virginia.edu/socsci/nipa/nipa.html& (accessed May 2000).
14. World Bank 2000, 260–61.
15. OECD 1997, as cited by OECD 1998, 131.
16. As of April 2000. The three U.S. banks are Citigroup, Bank of America, and Chase Manhattan.
Economist, 18 April 2000, 82.
17. The twenty-￿ ve biggest foreign banks in the world keep roughly5.6 percent ($536 billion)of their
assets in the United States. International Banking Regulator, 29 July 1996, 4.
18. Financial intermediation services and auxiliary services between residents and nonresidents,
including commissions and fees for letters of credit, lines of credit, ￿ nancial leasing services, foreign
exchange transactions, consumer and business credit services, brokerage services, and underwriting
services.
19. OECD 2000.
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20 As a result, regulators in the United States and
the United Kingdom exercise jurisdiction over ￿ nancial institutions and networks
that are strategically important to the global ￿ nancial system as a whole.
The dominance of these two countries’ banking sectors is matched, and perhaps
exceeded, by their dominance in equity markets. The world’s largest stock markets
are located in New York and London. The U.S. stock market alone accounts for
nearly 50 percent of the world’s stock market valuation.
21 The global market value
of ￿ rms listed on the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and Nasdaq (the U.S.
over-the-counterequities market) in 1999 was $11.4 and $5.2 trillion, respectively;
the corresponding￿ gure for the London Stock Exchange was $3 trillion,and for the
Tokyo exchanges was $4.5 trillion.
22 U.S. stock markets raised $14.5 trillion for
￿ rms in the United States over the course of the 1990s.
23
Exchanges in the United States and London are highly internationalized and
becoming even more so. The London Stock Exchange lists companies from sixty
countries,
24 and the comparable ￿ gure for the NYSE is forty-nine. The number of
foreign companies listed on the NYSE quadrupled between 1992 and 2000, for a
current total of 400 ￿ rms.
25 Meanwhile, the volume of trade in non-U.S. shares on
the NYSE reached $687 billionin 1999.
26 The United States also dominatesthe $22
billion international market for depositary receipts,
27 accounting for three-quarters
of the world total.
28 With the most active exchanges in the world, North America
accounts for nearly as much turnover in exchange-traded options and futures as do
Europe and Asia combined.
29
Finally, much of the world’s ￿ nancial regulatory expertise, though dif￿cult to
quantify, is concentrated in the United States and the United Kingdom. What has
come to be known globally as “best practices” in supervisionand regulationusually
emanate from these countries (from the public regulatory apparatus, but also from
the self-regulatory practices of private entities).
30 It may also be signi￿cant, though
20. BIS 1998a, 136, tab. 13. The United States and the United Kingdom accounted for 240,000
settlements messages through the Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications
(SWIFT); the rest of the G-10 combined accounted for 290,000 such messages.
21. Economist, 8 July 2000, 77.
22. New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) 1999, 3.
23. NYSE 1999, 6.
24. London Stock Exchange website, available at ^http://www.londonstockexchange.com/internation-
al/default.asp& (accessed May 2000).
25. Economist, 17 June 2000.
26. NYSE 1999, 4.
27. Negotiable certi￿ cates issued by a U.S. bank for shares of stock issued by a foreign corporation.
The securities are held in a custodial account, usually in a foreign bank (the depositary receipt itself is
registered with the SEC), and give the holder the same bene￿ ts of ownership as a share holder.
28. Economist, 15 January 2000, 77.
29. Futures Industry Association Data, Bank for International Settlements.
30. As a “self-regulatory organization” the NYSE has a sophisticated computerized program for
detecting suspicious trading activities and has been active in investigating activities that break its own
regulations. This task is performed using Automated Search and Match (ASAM), which contains the
names of 800,000 executives, lawyers, bankers, and accountants, plus public pro￿le data on of￿ cers and
directors of approximately 80,000 public corporations and 30,000 corporate subsidiaries. Between 1992
594 International Organizationonly an indirect measure of regulatory capacity, that the Federal Reserve System
produces and analyzes much more quickly the data that is relevant to understanding
market trends than do central banks elsewhere.
31 Since the Basel Committee for
Bank Supervisioncame into existence in 1974, it has been chaired by a banker from
either the United States or the United Kingdom for nineteen years, from the
Netherlands for four years, and from Italy for four years.
32 Given the strong norm
of rotating power in many Eurocentric institutions, it is interesting that this
committee has never been chaired by a central banker from Germany, Switzerland,
France, or Japan. An American with extensive supervisory and regulatory experi-
ence was recently chosen to chair the new Financial Stability Institute, whose
purpose it is to assist bank supervisors around the world in improving and
strengthening their ￿ nancial systems.
33
The Argument
This concentration of ￿ nancial power has profound implications for regulatory
harmonization. The size of the internal U.S. market gives U.S. regulators an
incentive to make unilateral regulatory decisions, even if foreign regulators do not
follow suit. The United States is “hegemonic” in ￿ nance in the sense that it is
costlier to alter its preferred regulatory innovationthan to try to change the policies
of the rest of the world. U.S. regulators can be thought of as unconditional ￿ rst
movers: ￿ nancialregulatoryinnovationwill be motivatedby and respond to internal
regulatory needs and politics (such as maintaining the national ￿ nancial system,
protecting domestic investors, improving transparency or ef￿ ciency, or securing
other social or political goals). Certainly regulatory decisions are subject to com-
petitive constraints, but the size and ef￿ ciency of U.S. ￿ nancial markets and
institutions often render such constraints nonbinding. The framework I develop
here, therefore, takes U.S. regulatory innovation itself as an exogenous expression
of the domestic political economy. Virtually every political account of ￿ nancial
and 1999, 176 cases on an annual average basis were referred to hearings panels for disciplinary action.
NYSE Web site ^http://www.NYSE.com& (accessed May 2000).
31. According to the Economist, the Federal Reserve System is much faster at collecting and
analyzing data than the European Central Bank or the Bank of Japan. Economist, 22 April 2000, 74.
32. The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision has been chaired as follows: 1974–77: Sir George
Blunden (executive director of the Bank of England); 1977–88: W. P. Cooke (associate director of the
Bank of England); 1988–91: H. J. Muller (executive director of de Nederlandische Bank); 1991–93:
E. Gerald Corrigan (president of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York); 1993–97: T. Padoa-Schioppa
(deputy director general of the Bank of Italy); 1977–1978: T. de Swaan (executive director of de
Nederlandische Bank); and 1998–present: William J. McDonough (president and chief executive of￿cer
of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York). A history of the committee can be found at ^http://
www.bis.org/publ/bcbsc101.pdf& (accessed June 2000).
33. The FSI was formed in 1998 by the Bank for International Settlements and the Basel Committee
on Banking Supervision. Its chair is John Heiman, whose resume ´ includes a directorship at Merrill
Lynch, U.S. comptroller of the currency, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and the New York
Federal Reserve.
International Politics of Harmonization 595regulation in the secondary literature supports this assumption.
34 International
policies of the dominant center, however, are formulated in response to or in
anticipationof the reactionsof therest of the world to a particularregulatorychange.
Whatever the content of the United States’ regulatory innovation, enhancement,
or deregulation,it has the potential to change signi￿cantly the context for ￿nancial
markets and hence it affects regulators in the rest of the world. Such a change has
one of three outcomes; it may (1) provide incentives for other regulators to emulate
(implying a positive reaction function), (2) provide incentivesfor other regulatorsto
diverge (a negative reaction function), or (3) have no effects on others.
35 One can
think of this reaction function as a continuum ranging from strong incentives to
defect (resembling a collaboration game) to strong incentives to emulate (resem-
bling a coordination game). Strategic incentives in the middle of this range are
unde￿ned, because the regulatory innovation does not signi￿cantly change the
conditions facing the rest of the world.
We can assess the impact of regulatorychangein the dominant￿ nancialcenterby
looking at how the innovation affects the pro￿tability of ￿ rms operating in foreign
jurisdictions.If the innovationrenders nonconformingjurisdictionsrelatively costly
or risky sites for conductingbusiness, a logical competitivemove by the jurisdiction
would be to emulate the regulatory change in order to maintain or attract business.
Access to the markets of the dominant ￿ nancial center also provides a powerful
market incentive to conform to the regulatory environment of the dominant center.
In both cases, market pressures and the opportunities that follow directly from the
regulatory change in the dominantcenterencourageharmonization.When this is the
case, the dominant center can afford to take a politically passive approach to
international harmonization.
Some regulatory changes, however, can prompt divergent policy choices in
foreign jurisdictions. This situation occurs when a regulatory policy implemented
elsewhere creates an economic incentive to respond in the opposite direction.
Economic sanctions are a well-known example: a rule against providing goods or
credit to a particular country in effect increases the (market) returns to those willing
to defy the sanctioningcoalition.Or imagine the effect on the price of a therapeutic
drug in Mexico that has not been approved by the U.S. Food and Drug Adminis-
tration. Assuming Mexican authorities have reached an independent conclusion
regarding the safety and ef￿ cacy of the drug, they have powerful incentivesto make
it available, especially in light of its unavailability in the United States. In these
cases the market does not reinforce the regulation of the dominant jurisdiction. On
the contrary, it may raise the (opportunity) costs of harmonization.
Understanding the nature and extent of externalities is essential to understanding
the dominant ￿ nancial center’s international policies relating to a particular inno-
vation. The key question is whether the rest of the world’s aggregate equilibrium
34. See Sobel 1994 a,b; Reinicke 1995; and Oatley and Nabors 1998.
35. Pahre 1999.
596 International Organizationreaction creates a signi￿cant negative externality for the ￿ rst mover. Because the
dominant center has already determined that the regulatory innovation supports its
own domestic interest, no combination of responses by the rest of the world’s
regulators will cause it to alter its own internal regulatory stance. It will, however,
anticipate costly foreign resistance to its regulations. If negative externalities are
signi￿cant, the question the dominant ￿ nancial center faces in formulating its
international policies is how it can change the choices of other ￿ nancial regulators
at reasonable cost.
Supposethe world’s reactionto the initialmove causesa highnegativeexternality
for the ￿ rst mover. Ratherthan meekly retracting a regulatory innovation,regulators
in the dominant ￿ nancial center anticipate costly foreign resistance and mobilize
political pressure to change the reactions of important foreign regulators. In fact, it
would be reasonable to expend political resources up to the cost of the negative
externality it is importing. If the negative externality is very costly, we should see
the dominant ￿ nancial center exerting a good deal of political pressure. We should
also observe efforts to minimize the costs of addressing these externalities. For
example, if the sources of the externalities are distinct or if the externality is
divisible, we could expect the United States to target its pressure accordingly.
Where the source of the externality is uncertain or constantly shifting, or where the
externality is not easily targeted, the dominant center might engage multilateral
institutions as a more ef￿ cient way to press for regulatory change in foreign
jurisdictions. However, if the negative externalities experienced or anticipated by
the dominant center as a result of the reactions of the rest of the world are small,
there is no reason to expect a very active internationalcomponent to the regulatory
change. In this case the United States should not care whether the rest of the world
adopts the policy innovation.
The role of multilateral institutions ￿ ows from the hegemon’s anticipation of
externalities. These institutions can be created and used strategically by the domi-
nant ￿ nancial center to achieve its desired regulatory outcome—the mitigation of
negative externalities—in an economical fashion. The framework predicts that their
strength and role will re￿ ect the strategic problems of the dominantcenter. After all,
collective action problems and disagreements over distributive issues render insti-
tutions built by opposing regulatory coalitions highly unlikely. Where multilateral
approaches are unnecessary to avoid externalities in the dominant center, this
framework expects multilateralinstitutionsto be weak, or at most facilitative rather
than active enforcers of regulatory harmonization.
By combiningthese two dimensions—the extentto which foreign regulatorshave
an incentive to emulate and the extent and nature of the externalities anticipatedby
the dominant ￿ nancial center—it is possible to lay out the mechanisms by which
harmonization is expected to occur and the role for international institutionsin this
process (see Figure 1).
In quadrant 1 of Figure 1 regulators in smaller jurisdictions have an incentive to
emulate in a policy area when the potential negative externalities for the dominant
center are high. The dominant center supports these adjustments because in the
International Politics of Harmonization 597absence of harmonization it may experience negative externalities. The dominant
center bene￿ts from supporting the creation and activities of an international
institution with broad-based membership encompassing the range of the sources of
anticipated externalities. This institution need only play an informational role
regarding the nature of the dominant ￿ nancial center’s standards, and may provide
technical assistance to jurisdictions wishing to implement them. Although these
standards may not have been preferred in the absence of the dominant center’s
innovation, smaller ￿ nancial centers have incentives to respond by adjusting their
own regulations. In this quadrant, we expect harmonization to take place primarily
through market incentives and to be facilitated by the dominant ￿ nancial center
through an institution designed to bolster the technical ability of smaller jurisdic-
tions to adhere.
The expectations are very different in quadrant 2. The key difference is that
smaller jurisdictions have an incentive to resist the dominant ￿ nancial center’s
FIGURE 1. Expectations: Incentives for regulatory harmonization (dominant
center, followers) and likely role of international institutions
598 International Organizationregulatory innovation.Moreover, their reactions create negativeexternalitiesfor the
dominant center. The dominant center, concerned with limiting the impact on its
national ￿ rms or at home, pressures smaller jurisdictions to match its ￿ nancial
regulations.One way to do this is through unilateral pressure, which is a reasonable
response as long as the sources of the externality are stable and distinct. In some
cases the dominant ￿ nancial center may be able to target or divert negative
externalitiesat minimal cost, for example, by making bilateral agreements or taking
unilateral action to mitigate the transmission of the negative externality from one
jurisdiction to another.
36 However, in other cases buying off one producer of a
negative externality may only encourage the private entity that is the source of the
externality to migrate to another jurisdiction. This is especially problematic when
jurisdictionsare highlysubstitutablefor thekindof activityunder consideration,and
when curtailing the activity in some jurisdictions actually raises the payoffs to its
few remaining (unregulated) practitioners. If these externalities cannot be targeted
or diverted at reasonable cost, it is more rational for the dominant ￿ nancial center
to press for regulatory harmonization by creating and backing multilateral institu-
tions that not only provide technical assistance (which would not be suf￿ cient to
convince smaller jurisdictions to harmonize their rules in this case) but also exert
overt political pressure on noncompliant jurisdictions.
Since defection problems often create incentives to misrepresent behavior, mul-
tilateral institutions under these conditions will often be essential in gathering
“objective” information through surveillance protocols. International institutions
will also be important to the dominant ￿ nancial center for coordinating potentially
costly punishments that might be subject to problems of free-ridership in their
absence.
37 If externalities are not divertible, or if their source is uncertain or
constantly shifting (that is, if they approximate a “public bad”), we would expect
membership in such an institution to be broad (with a caveat that it may be limited
by a desire to include only those who can be persuaded to comply through
institutional mechanisms).
38 If harmonization takes place, it will be through overt
political pressure from the dominant ￿ nancial center, most likely exercised through
a multilateral institution.
The prediction in quadrant 3 is the opposite of quadrant 2. Smaller jurisdictions
have marketincentivesto adjustto the regulatorychangein the dominantcenter, and
the negative externalities anticipated by the ￿ nancial center are minimal. Smaller
jurisdictions have market motives to adjust, and the dominant center has little
36. However, as Ken Oye has noted, every diversionary agreement increases the expected negative
impact that the externality will have on other jurisdictions, creating a strong incentive to strike bilateral
deals with a number of foreign regulators. Oye 1992, 26.
37. Martin 1992b.
38. Downs and Rocke 1995. They argue that since enforcement of agreements can be costly, there are
informational conditions under which exclusion of some “relevant” players from international agree-
ments is reasonable, even though they may be producers of negative externalities. Uncertainty over
compliance conditionsany expectation of a direct relationship between the extent of externalities and the
scope of participation in formal harmonization.
International Politics of Harmonization 599incentiveto respond at all. There is little reason to create an internationalinstitution
in this case; harmonization is likely to proceed in a very decentralized fashion.
Multilateral institutional arrangements that do develop are likely to do little more
than provide technical assistance or legitimate a “focal point” that provides a
multilateral veneer to an essentially unilateral decision made in the dominant
￿ nancial center.
39 Market forces rather than overt political pressure will foster
decentralized harmonization in this case.
Finally, consider the case in which smaller jurisdictions have no incentive to
adjust their regulations in response to the dominant center, yet the dominant center
experiences no externalities as a result of such resistance (quadrant 4). Smaller
jurisdictions do not want to emulate, but the dominant center does not care. There
is no reason to expect the dominant center to invest in multilateral institutions; nor
should we expect harmonizationto take place under these conditions.But if it does,
the mechanisms will be political rather than market based.
It is worth pointing out how this framework differs from institutionalisttheories
that rest on more liberal functionalist formulations. There is nothing particularly
“cooperative” or even Pareto-improving about this situation. Regulators elsewhere
may not even have been consulted or have participated in any meaningful way in
decisions that fundamentally alter their regulatory landscape. Smaller ￿ nancial
centers may have had to adjust to decisions made by the United States to avoid
worse outcomes, but they may have preferred no innovationby the dominantcenter
to begin with.
40 Indeed, this framework predicts an important role for coercion and
persuasion when incentives to diverge are strong and negative externalities are
severe. Financialdominanceof the United States precludesa return to the status quo
as an option, even if that is what many smaller jurisdictions would prefer.
Furthermore, by taking into account both incentives to emulate and externalities,
this framework is able to provide nuanced expectations based on the strategic
context that can differ markedly across issue areas in ￿ nance. Much of the literature
on international institutionshas been inspired by the analysis of cooperation games
versus coordinationgames.
41 Most of these analysesassume rough parity among the
players and ignore the role that power and persuasion play in arriving at a stable
equilibrium. In the framework here the anticipation of externalities provides the
motivationfor the dominantcenterto use politicalpressure to counteruncooperative
behavior and to provide technical or other assistance (if necessary) to encourage
emulation.It also allows for more nuanced predictionsaboutinstitutionalform, with
shifting, uncertain, or worldwide sources of negative externalities encouraging the
dominant center to invest in multilateralism.
39. This is the function that Garrett and Weingast emphasize in the case of the European Court of
Justice. Garrett and Weingast 1993.
40. See, for example, Gruber 2000.
41. See Stein 1983; Snidal 1985; and Martin 1992a. Krasner notes, however, that there has been little
effort to classify existing international regimes by the nature of the problem, reinforcing a tendency to
emphasize prisoners’ dilemmas over coordination games. Krasner 1991, 364.
600 International OrganizationThis framework differs as well from theories that expect regulatory races to the
bottom.
42 There are good reasons to expect dominant ￿ nancial jurisdictions to
function as “regulatory anchors” in the sense that they do not respond in kind to
what may seem to be competitiveregulationsby foreign jurisdictions.Indeed, if the
dominant￿ nancial center is large and competitiveenough,it seems utterly arbitrary
to assume that it will sacri￿ ce its national regulatory preferences to engage in a
downward competitivespiral with foreign jurisdictions.I make the more reasonable
assumption that a ￿ nancial center as large and competitive as the United States is
unlikely to reverse its domestically preferred regulatory course. This would not, of
course, prevent races to the bottom among smaller or less-ef￿ cient jurisdictions,
43
but it does provide a backstop to the generalizedregulatory deterioration sometimes
alluded to in the literature.
Issue areas. In this section I provide evidence for the argument. The research
designis simple: I examinefour issue areas of international￿ nance that illustratethe
combinationsof values on the key independentvariables (incentivesto emulate and
the nature and extentof externalities).“Financialdominance”is constantthroughout
these cases. The central question is whether the mechanisms of harmonization (the
relative roles of market incentives and political pressures) and the role of interna-
tional institutions (whether they are unimportant or central to the harmonization
process; whether they are designed to facilitate, legitimate, or enforce) ￿ t the
expectations of the framework.
The case ofcapitaladequacyrules: High negativeexternalities,high incentives
to emulate (quadrant 1)
The globalization of banking increases the possibility that any weak bank
involved in the increasingly dense network of interbank relations potentially can
transmit its weaknesses throughout the international banking system. One can gain
an appreciation of these linkages by looking at the size of the interbank market: for
banks in countries reporting to the Bank for International Settlements (BIS),
between 1983 and 1997 interbank claims averaged about 58 percent of total assets
and interbankliabilitiesaveragedabout62 percent of totalliabilities.
44 Furthermore,
banks that are linked through the interbank market are highly leveraged, which
raises “the possibility that failure of one bank to settle net transactions with other
banks will trigger a chain reaction, depriving other banks of funds and preventing
42. The “race to the bottom” thesis is usually intended to convey the idea that in a competitive
situation regulatory standards tend to fall below an optimal level and not that they literally crash to the
level of the lowest existing national standard. The thesis is propounded in a number of issue-areas,
includingenvironmentalstandards (Porter 1999) and corporate law (Daniels 1991). However, for critical
analysis and contrary ￿ndings in the areas of trade and ￿nance, respectively, see D. Vogel 1995; and
S. Vogel 1996.
43. See, for example, Porter 1999.
44. Bank for International Settlements Web site, ^www.bis.org&.
International Politics of Harmonization 601them from closing their positions in turn.”
45 Capital adequacy standards are
explicitly intended to “protect the safety and stability of the system as a whole”
46
from risky activities of weakly capitalized ￿ rms. Highly leveraged loans linked
through a transnational interbank market create a situation in which the U.S.
banking system is potentially subject to the negative externalities of poor capital
adequacy regulation in other parts of the world.
However, there are strong incentives to emulate a U.S. regulatory innovation
involving capital adequacy standards. The fundamental reason is that international
banking is characterized by information asymmetries that provide an opening for
opportunistic behavior. Rules regulating capital adequacy may convey important
information on the quality of a ￿ rm as a counterparty to an agreement. In this
environment, appropriate prudential regulations are a competitive advantage that
other jurisdictions have an incentive to copy. In the words of the chairman of the
Federal Reserve Bank of Australia, once capital adequacy requirements are adopted
by the Central Banks in G-10 countries, “there is considerable[market] pressure on
others to follow—otherwise their banks risk being perceived as somewhat inferior
institutionsin competitive situations.”
47 A regulatory race to the bottom is conceiv-
able in the absence of any obvious focal point,
48 but once the dominant ￿ nancial
center has adopted a clear standard, there is very little incentive to reduce standards
and risk developinga reputationas “poorly regulated.”Most banks are simply in no
position to forgo reputational concerns and compete for international business on
price alone.For this reason, strong incentivesexist to emulate the standards adopted
in the dominant ￿ nancial center. Capital adequacy standards are thus illustrative of
the kinds of cases that fall into quadrant 1 (see Figure 2).
Regulatory innovation in this area began in the United States in response to the
savingsand loanscrisis of the1980s.Worried by a trend toward capitaldeterioration
despite growing ￿ nancial risks associated with internationalization and liberaliza-
tion—and the initial serious concern that differential approaches to capital require-
ments would constitute a competitive disadvantagefor banks chartered in countries
with more stringent requirements—the Federal Reserve and the Bank of England
struck a bilateral agreement that provided for a common de￿ nition of capital. They
agreed to adopt a risk-weighting system for each class of assets, to include
“off-balance-sheet” items in risk determination, and to adopt a formula for calcu-
45. Fitch 1993, 600.
46. E. Gerald Corrigan,president ofthe Federal Reserve Bank ofNew York, statement before the U.S.
Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 3 May 1990, as quoted by Yasushro
Maehara, Comments, in Herring and Litan 1995, 154.
47. Bernard W. Fraser, governor of the Reserve Bank of Australia, remarks to the 24th Conference of
Economists, Adelaide, 25 September 1995, reprinted in Reserve Bank of Australia Bulletin, October
1995. Note that this does not imply a linear relationship between higher capital adequacy standards and
a reputation for safety. At some point (which even large banks and regulators would ￿ nd dif￿cult to
specify) the cost of holding capital in reserve exceeds the value of the added safety and no longer
contributes in any meaningful way to a safe reputation. Thus, there is little danger of an inde￿ nite “race
to the top.”
48. Kapstein 1989, 324.
602 International Organizationlating speci￿c capital requirements for individual banks based on their weighted-
asset risk pro￿le.
49
The case of capital adequacy standards ￿ ts the expectations of the proposed
framework reasonably well. Strong market-based incentives have encouraged con-
vergence in this area. The bilateral accord between the two largest players imme-
diately sparked intense negotiations among the G-10 countries to adopt a common
approach to capital adequacy. By some accounts, Japan, Germany, and France
accepted the U.S./U.K. framework (with minor changes) because they were con-
cerned that, without adjustment, their banks might not meet standards prevailing in
the two dominant centers.
50 In December 1987 central bankers from the G-10
countries adopted guidelines for evaluating the adequacy of capital in their inter-
49. See ibid., 323–47; and Reinicke 1995.
50. Kapstein 1989, 340–41.
FIGURE 2. Issue areas, harmonization processes, and institutional outcomes
International Politics of Harmonization 603national banks and agreed to reach an established minimum level by 1992. By the
end of 1993, internationallyactive G-10 banks had capital ratios that exceeded the
prescribed minimum, often signi￿cantly.
51
By the mid-1990s, the European Union had followed suit in their decision to use
the G-10 guidelines as a basis for the Capital Adequacy Directive (CAD), which
came into effect in January 1996.
52 Even more signi￿cant, a number of countries
who did not participate in the G-10 process and have no obligation whatsoever to
follow guidelines originating in Basel have voluntarily done so. Many developing
countries have, for example, adopted the Basel Committee’s 8 percent capital
adequacy rule for international banks. Others have decided unilaterally to match
Basel rules regarding disclosure requirements for derivatives activities, citing G-10
rules as “global standards.”
53 By 1994, all 129 countries surveyed by the BIS had
capital requirements of some description, and in 92 percent of cases, a Basel-like
risk-weighted approach was reportedly followed. Capital charges for market risk
exposure—a relatively new development—were imposed by 23 percent of the
sample, and fully 85 percent of non-G-10 countries declared their intention to
implement a 1995 amendment to the original 1988 Capital Accord.
54 Even if these
￿ gures are exaggerated, they re￿ ect an apparent desire to emulate the rules set forth
by the G-10.
The process of rule development and dissemination has largely been market
driven, though the BIS and more recently the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
have played a facilitative role. Through meetings, informational conferences, and
technical training courses with regional central banking organizations, the BIS has
actively supported the dissemination of G-10 prudential banking regulations and
standards among emerging ￿ nancial markets.
55 In the wake of the Asian ￿ nancial
crisis, banking supervisors in Indonesia have moved to phase in Basel’s 8 percent
capital adequacy ratio,
56 despite the estimated price of recapitalization at this ratio
51. Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa,chairman of the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision,speech on
Banking Supervision in a Global Market, Vienna, October 1994.
52. John Tattersall, CAD—Implementation, Foreign Exchange and Money Market, May/June 1995,
28. This has not been without some complications for the EU, since it is in the business of creating
binding directives with which national legislation must be brought into conformity, a process that can
barely keep up with the changes in regulatory recommendations coming from G-10 central bankers (and
in fact may not be optimal given the high degree of technical uncertainty and the value of incomplete
contracting in this area). Harmonization has also been complicated by the fact that the G-10 focus their
attentionon large banks in major money centers, whereas the EU necessarily crafts directives fornational
banking systems that comprise large and small banks.
53. White 1996, 22.
54. Survey results cited by Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa in his address to the 9th International
Conference of Banking Supervisors, Stockholm, 12–14 June 1996.
55. See White 1996, 22; and Tommaso Padoa-Schioppa, chairman of the Basle Committee on
Banking Supervision, speech on Banking Supervision in a Global Market, Vienna, October 1994.
56. All bankswere to achieve a minimum capital adequacy ratio of 4 percent by the end of1998,rising
to 8 percent by the end of 1999, and to 10 percent by the end of 2000. Banks that did not meet these
minimum ratios were subject to sanction by the Bank ofIndonesia.Available at ^www.imf.org& (accessed
January 2000).
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57 Korea has also declared its intent to upgrade its
prudential standards to meet the core principles of the Basel Accord and mobilized
trillions of won for purposes of recapitalization with the Basel ratios in mind.
58
Thailand adopted 8.5 percent recapitalization ratios for all surviving banks.
59 The
explicit adoption of these targets has been essential for establishing the credibility
of nationalbank reforms. To assist in the promulgationof its standards in the region,
the BIS opened its ￿ rst representative of￿ ce outside of its headquarters in Basel in
July of 1998.
No banking supervisor in the world has been able to speak of prudential
regulationswithout reference to “internationalstandards” that have spread from the
initial U.S.-U.K. agreement to the G-10 to the EU to a numberof emerging markets.
The BIS has provided technical assistance and promoted its rules as a focal point
against which to judge the adequacy of banks’ capital ratios in jurisdictions around
the world. Despite some effort by the IMF to subject countriesseeking assistance to
some form of conditional adoption of these rules,
60 the market pressure to meet
internationalstandards has been far more importantto harmonizationthan organized
politicalpressure. Capital adequacy standards have become more rigorous and more
widespread than a model of competitive regulatory laxity would suggest. Just how
well these rules will be implemented remains to be seen, especially in the Asian
￿ nancial centers where restructuring is currently underway. But generally speaking,
market pressures to match internationalstandards have been far more importantthan
political pressure, in sharp contrast to the case of anti-money laundering efforts,
discussed in the next section.
The case of anti-money laundering rules: High negative externalities, low
incentives to emulate (quadrant 2)
Money laundering supports a negative externality in the United States—criminal
activity—that is extraordinarily dif￿cult to eliminate, target, or divert. Estimates of
the amount of money laundered provide an upper limit to the range of this
externality: by some estimates, $1 billion of criminal pro￿ts ￿ nds its way into the
world’s ￿ nancial markets every day.
61 Estimates of the annual amount of drug
57. Part of this ￿ gure includes repaying the Bank of Indonesia for provision of liquidity,and much is
expected to be recovered as recapitalized banks are sold. Memorandum of Economic and Financial
Policies, Indonesia, 10 April 1998. Available at ^www.imf.org& (accessed January 2000).
58. Korea Memorandum of Economic Policy, November 1998. Available at ^www.imf.org& (accessed
January 2000).
59. Thailand, Memorandum of Economic Policy, 25 August 1998. Available at ^www.imf.org&
(accessed January 2000).
60. Meeting Basel standards is included in every discussion of ￿ nancial and economic plans among
the Asian countries seeking IMF assistance, but the IMF does not consider prudential banking standards
to be among its “core responsibilities” and thus collaborates with the BIS on dissemination of these
principles. The IMF has, however, intensi￿ed efforts to use Art. IV consultations to promote these rules.
IMF 1998.
61. Estimate given by Eduardo Vetere, head of the Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice Branch at
the opening sitting of the European Regional Preparatory Meeting for the 9th UN Congress on Crime
Prevention and the Treatment of Offenders (1995), Vienna, 28 February 1994.
International Politics of Harmonization 605pro￿ts moving through the U.S. ￿ nancial system have been as high as $100
billion.
62 Michel Camdessus, former director of the IMF, estimated that in 2000 the
yearly global value of illicit money laundered was equal to between 2 and 5 percent
of world production.
63 Even if only a fraction of this total results from crimes
affecting the United States, the potential negative effects are considerable. And as
the recent case of the laundering of stolen aid to Russia indicates, the precedent
crime does not have to be committed in the United States to frustrate broader U.S.
interests. Moreover, the situation will likely deteriorate as capital controls around
the world continue to loosen and the scrutiny given international transactions
continues to ease.
64 As evidence that the United States views money laundering as
a serious threat, the U.S. Treasury Department operates the largest currency
transaction reporting system in the world at an estimated cost to the banking
industry as high as $136 million annually.
65
For a number of reasons, smaller jurisdictions tend not to want to emulate the
tighteranti-money laundering regulationsof the dominantcenters. Indeed, stringent
reporting requirements in the United States may make the banking secrecy offered
by the legitimate private banking industry in such countries as Switzerland,
Liechtenstein, and Luxembourg even more lucrative. Certainly, adopting tough
reporting requirements could push funds offshore.
66 Swiss of￿ cials have long
recognized that bank secrecy has contributed signi￿cantly to the country’s high
standard of living and thus “at least indirectly concerns substantial economic
interests of the state.”
67 In Liechtenstein, even mild rules regarding “due dili-
gence”—requiring bankers to report suspicious activities to authorities—“pose a
direct threat to Liechtenstein’s basic competitiveness,” according to bankers in
Vaduz.
68 Developing economies may be even more resistant. Banking secrecy
combined with loose supervision may be an attractive development policy for a
large number of smaller resource-poor countries and territories. In an effort to
jump-start an international ￿ nancial-services sector, some jurisdictions have insti-
tuted easy rules of incorporation,no recording requirements for large cash transac-
tions, and a limited asset seizure capability. The fewer the jurisdictions willing to
provide such services with minimal scrutiny, the better the terms these jurisdictions
are likely to be able to extract from “investors.” The conclusion in this case is quite
62. U.S. Treasury Web site ^www.ustreas.gov/￿ncen/border.html& (accessed January 2000).
63. Economist, 1 July 2000, 70.
64. See testimony of the governor of the Bank of Italy, April 1989, quoted in Gurwin 1990. See also
Tanzi 1996.
65. See U.S. Treasury Department Web site at ^www.ustreas.gov/￿ ncen/follow1.html& (accessed
January 2000). This is an industry estimate. Powis 1992.
66. Lisa Troshinsky, Ex-NatWest Lawyer Fears “Know Your Customer” Fallout, International
Banking Regulator, 5 August 1996, 1, 6. On the size of the private banking industry in Switzerland, see
Ian Rodger, Survey of Swiss Banking, Financial Times [London], 26 October 1995, III.
67. This statement is a translation of of￿ cial Swiss federal government policy, quoted in Aubert,
Kernen, and Schoenle 1978, 59. (Translation from a summary generously supplied by an of￿ cial of the
IMF.)
68. Euromoney, July 1996, 151.
606 International Organizationdifferent from that of capital adequacy regulation. Unlike the interest ￿ nancial
institutionsmay have in developing a reputation for safety, “it is not necessarily in
the direct ￿ nancial interest of ￿ nancial institutions to adopt anti-laundering behav-
ior.”
69 Anti-money launderingefforts provide no clear economicpayoff, and may in
fact exact immediate and unrecoverable costs to ￿ nancial intermediaries.
As in the capital adequacy case, international initiatives to control money
laundering have come primarily from the United States, in alliance with the United
Kingdom, but also with France, and increasingly Australia.
70 By 1986, the United
States was the only country to have criminalized money laundering, and it remains
by far the leader in prosecutions.
71 Because most countries do not wish to emulate
U.S. policies, and because the externalities to the United States have been high, the
harmonization that has taken place has been driven by hardball political pressure.
The U.S. Congress began with the “Kerry Amendment,”
72 which required the U.S.
Treasury to negotiate with foreign countries with the objective of having foreign
banks record all cash deposits over US$10,000 and to provide information to U.S.
authorities in the event of a narcotics-related investigation. Should a bank fail to
agree, the amendment gave the president the power to deny that bank access to the
U.S. clearinghouse system. But for a number of reasons—including the universal
nature of the problem, opposition from Treasury,
73 the fear of stimulating foreign
alternatives to U.S. clearinghouse facilities, and the fear of retaliation against U.S.
banks—this unilateral approach ￿ zzled with few tangible results.
The United States has had dif￿ culty drumming up support for its anti-money
laundering crusade, but with Europe’s eventual support the Financial Action Task
Force (FATF) was created by the OECD countries in 1989. This institutionuses the
only instrument at its disposal—peer pressure—to embarrass governments into
adoptingstricter controls over money laundering.The FATF uses a graduated set of
sanctions to review and in￿uence the policies of its own members and those of
nonmembers to follow the spirit of its “Forty Recommendations” promulgated in
1990 (updated in September 1995). These recommendations call for states to ratify
the 1988 Vienna Convention Against Illicit Traf￿ c in Narcotic Drugs and Psycho-
tropic Substances, which speci￿es “intentionally” laundering drug pro￿ts as a
criminal activity.
74 They also call on governments to adopt effective seizure and
forfeiture laws and to prohibit anonymous accounts. The FATF employs a system
69. Quirk 1996, 24.
70. With one of the most technologically sophisticated methods for detecting ￿nancial patterns
associated with illicit activities, Australian authorities have used their own forfeiture funds to establish
a secretariat for the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) in Asia. U.S. Treasury and FINCEN of￿ cials,
discussions with author, Washington, D.C., 5 and 8 August 1996.
71. Between 1991 and 1993 the number of cases ￿led and tried under Title 18 USC 1956 or 1957
approximately quintupled. In 1993, 822 cases were ￿led and 106 tried. Justice Department ￿gures,
reported in Courtenay 1994.
72. Section 4702 of the 1988 Omnibus Drug Bill. See also Crocker 1990.
73. U.S. Congress 1990,28. This oppositionwas also con￿rmed by a U.S. Treasury of￿cial, interview
with author, Washington, D.C., 7 August 1996.
74. The Vienna Convention (20 December 1988), Article 3, section 1, (b) (i) and (ii).
International Politics of Harmonization 607of mutual review in which each member’s laws and efforts are scrutinized by a
FATF team and then assessed by the full membership. The mildest sanction is a
letter from the presidentindicatingshortcomingsin a particularcountry;theharshest
sanction is expulsion from the FATF. Turkey has been sanctioned—for several
years it was the only country in the FATF that had failed to make money laundering
a crime—and signi￿cantly changed its laws as a result.
75 The FATF’s “Recommen-
dation 21” also calls for sanctions against noncooperative nonmembers. The Sey-
chelles was one of the ￿ rst countriesto be on the receiving end of such a sanction.
76
The FATF routinely urges ￿ nancial institutionsto avoid doing business in countries
with seriously inadequate money laundering laws and posts the list of such
jurisdictions on its Web site.
77 Meanwhile, the United States and the United
Kingdomoften coordinatetheirbilateralpressure on uncooperativejurisdictionsand
recently have denounced Antigua as un￿t to conduct business with their national
￿ rms.
78
The convergenceacross nationaljurisdictions since 1986 has been detectable but
hard fought and is far from complete. Almost all industrializedcountries now agree
that money laundering should be considered a crime, but few countries have
embraced the U.S. approach of comprehensive reporting of all cash transactions
above$10,000(most banks have lobbiedtheir governments hard to reject U.S.-style
record keeping and reporting).
79 Tightening money laundering rules continues to
meet with signi￿cant resistance in much of the ￿ nanciallyin￿ uential world. Outside
of Japan, Singapore, and Hong Kong, money laundering is not a crime in much of
Asia. Cooperation in the Western Hemisphere provides an interesting contrast:
sustained U.S. leadership in such forums as the “Summit of the Americas” keeps
laggards in the international spotlight. Many more Central and South American
countries have made money laundering a crime and have even agreed to “self-
assessment” (though not mutual assessment, as in the FATF) in their own regional
grouping, the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF).
75. U.S. Treasury of￿ cial, interview with author, Washington, D.C., 5 August 1996.
76. In February 1996, the FATF vigorously and publicly opposed provisions of that country’s
“Economic Development Act,” which guaranteed anonymity, immunity from criminal prosecution, and
protection of all assets to anyone who invests more than $10 million in approved investment schemes in
the Seychelles. The (American) FATF president publicly termed the act “an incitement to criminals
throughoutthe world to use the Seychelles as a clearing bank for their illegally acquired gains with full
immunity.” Quotations reported by AP, Worldstream, International News, dateline Paris, 1 February
1996; and in We Love the EDA, The Indian Ocean Newsletter, No. 705, 10 February 1996. Seychelles’
defense of the law is reported in Mark Litchen, Storm Rages over Proposed Seychelles Investor
Legislation, International Money Marketing, 16 February 1996, 17.
77. Countries currently so listed include nine island countries as well as Israel, Lebanon, Liechten-
stein, Panama, Philippines, and Russia. Available at ^http://www.oecd.org/fatf/pdf/AR2000-en.pdf& (see
Annex A, 2–10) (accessed March 2001).
78. Economist, 1 July 2000, 70.
79. R. D. Fullerton, chairman and CEO, Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, Toronto,Clearing out
the Money Launderers, portions of a speech made before the Bankers Association for Foreign Trade
Conference, reprinted in The World of Banking, September–October 1990, 5–7.
608 International OrganizationIn short, harmonization of money laundering rules depends on political pressure
from the dominant ￿ nancial centers. This follows from the nature of this issue-area,
in which emulationhas its costsand thenegativeexternalitiesare high.Nor are these
externalities easily controlled through unilateral efforts or by targeting individual
jurisdictions. This provides incentives to create multilateral organizations with
surveillanceand enforcementpowers. A multilateralinstitution,exertingstrong peer
pressure coordinatedby thedominantcenters, has been crucial to rule harmonization
in this issue area.
The case of accounting standards for public offerings: Low negative external-
ities, high incentives to emulate (quadrant 3)
National securities regulators formulate the conditions under which companies
can offer their shares to the public on stock exchanges within their jurisdiction.Yet
the accounting rules used to evaluate the worth of companies so offered can vary
greatly from country to country. For example, when Daimler Benz ￿ rst reconciled
its accounts based on “U.S. generally accepted accounting principles” (USGAAP)
as a conditionof listing on the NYSE, potential investors were stunned to learn that
Daimler’s DM615 million pro￿t in 1993 under German accounting rules dissolved
into a DM1.8 billion loss using USGAAP for the same period.
80
Accounting standards for public equity offerings illustrate the conditionsdenoted
in quadrant 3 of Figure 2. In common with capital adequacy standards, but in
contrast to anti-money laundering regulations, there are signi￿cant incentives for
regulators and ￿ rms to adopt the accounting rules of the dominant ￿ nancial center.
Because stock trading was originally in￿uenced by time zones, this pattern is clear
at the regional level.
81 Thus, Canada’s standards tend to resemble those of the
United States,
82 New Zealand’s those of Australia, the Scandinavian countries’
those of Germany. Such coordinationis useful in the absence of globalor even G-10
agreement. Disagreements emerge over which rules should be the international
standard, but no nationalregulator has the incentive to differ radically from a major
market, and once accepted, incentives to defect are virtually nonexistent.
83 For
internationallyactive￿ rms, the transactionscosts of keepingup to speed on multiple
standards are likely to exceed the one-time adjustmentcosts to a single widely used
standard regardless of its “nationality.”Stock exchanges themselves want to attract
80. See The Economist Intelligence Unit, 13 May 1996; and New York Times, 31 March 1993, D8.
81. Jean-Francois Theodore, chairman and chief executive, SBF-Paris Bourse, The Emergence of
Transnational Financial Zones and Prospects for Harmonization, presentation at the 20th ISOCO
Conference, Paris, 11–13 July 1995.
82. SEC associate chief accountant, interview with author, Washington D.C., 13 August 1996. U.S.
and Canadian accounting boards routinely coordinate their standard setting, often jointly publishing
drafts and reports. See also Financial Times [London], 30 May 1996, 28.
83. One might object that there are incentives to diverge from foreign standards that are patently
inferior to those currently promulgated nationally, but this is very unlikely to be the case. Major markets
are only likely to develop in the presence of reasonable regulatory regimes (Sobel 1999), minimizing the
theoretical possibility that small markets might have objectively justi￿able reasons to prefer their
accounting rules over those prevailing in a major market.
International Politics of Harmonization 609as much high-quality foreign business as possible, making them strong proponents
of international standards.
84 As is the case with prudential regulations regarding
bank capital, market pressures reinforce harmonization: once the adjustment costs
are paid, there is no reason to buck the regulatory trend.
However, the United States experiences few if any negative externalities if other
jurisdictions continue to use their own national standards for public offerings. In
contrast to capital adequacy and anti-money laundering regulations, inadequate
accounting rules may result in allocative inef￿ciency, but they are not discussed in
terms of generating signi￿cant streams of negative externalities or serious systemic
risks for the United States.
85 Widely varying accounting rules can add to transac-
tions costs for ￿ rms that want to offer shares on foreign exchanges,potentiallydeter
cross-border listings (relatively few U.S. ￿ rms list on the London and Tokyo
exchanges, for example),
86 and confuse investors.
87 Negative externalities, how-
ever, have not been central to the de￿nition of the problem for the dominantcenters.
Market dominance in equities is central to the process of harmonization. A key
factor is the insistence by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) that any
￿ rm listed on a U.S. exchange must use USGAAP. Market power alone has led to
harmonization in this area: if companies want to list on U.S. stock exchanges, they
must be willingto pay the one-time adjustmentcost. Many ￿ rms have prepared their
statements voluntarily in order to maximize their access to international capital.
Thus, in the last few years, Swiss, French, and Belgian companies have tended to
adopt USGAAP or the somewhat less stringent International Accounting Standards
(IAS) currently under development by the International Accounting Standards
Committee (IASC).
88 In April 1996 Germany’s fourth-largest company, Veba, an
energy and industrial conglomerate now moving into telecommunications, adopted
USGAAP; its CEO explained,“It is a global capital market, and we all have to play
by the same rules.”
89 A raft of European multinationals, and most of corporate
Germany, including Bayer, BASF, and Hoechst, and many companies awaiting
privatization, including Deutsche Telekom, may seek NYSE listings and may have
84. NYSE of￿ cial, interview with author, New York, N.Y., 8 November 1995.
85. See, for example, the discussion in the introduction to Bloomer 1996.
86. Sobel 1994.
87. Michael Sharpe, chairman of the IASC, cited in International Securities Regulation Report, 26
October 1995, 1, 4. There continues to be a divide between the “British-U.S.” approach and the
“Continental” approach to accounting, which in turn have histories rooted in the way ￿ rms have
traditionally been ￿ nanced. The former stresses the shareholders’ need for information about earnings
and pro￿tability and is common where capital markets have traditionally provided the major source of
external ￿nancing for ￿ rms. Countries in this school include the United States, the United Kingdom,
Australia, New Zealand, and the Netherlands. However, a number of countries, especially in continental
Europe, use their tax books as the basis for ￿ nancial reporting, which tends to mingle signals about a
￿rm’s pro￿tability with its tax accounts and focuses on the long-term source of income rather than on
pro￿tability per se. Countries with accounting standards that ￿t this description include Germany, the
Scandinavian countries, France, Belgium, Italy, and Spain. Cummins, Harris, and Hassett 1994, 27.
88. Michael Sharpe, chairman of the IASC, cited in International Securities Regulation Report, 26
October 1995, 1, 4.
89. Economist Intelligence Unit, 15 April 1996.
610 International Organizationto opt for USGAAP standards until IASC standards are complete.
90 Interestingly,
the newly established Easdaq—a pan-European over-the-counter equities market
established at the initiative of the European Commission—has opted to use
USGAAP.
91 Harmonization in accounting standards for public offerings has been
decentralized and market driven toward conformity with the rules of the dominant
equities market.
Because the SEC knows that ￿ rms wanting to list on U.S. exchanges are likely to
be willing to pay the adjustment cost of reconciling their accounts to USGAAP, it
has little incentiveto foster internationalinstitutionsto harmonize accountingrules.
Thus, the IASC has enjoyed little support from U.S. regulatorsand in many respects
has had to reconcile its “multilateral”rules to the demands of the SEC. After all, the
IASC knows its standards have little credibility unless the SEC accepts them, and
as one might expect, those rules that the SEC has accepted have been quite close to
U.S. practices.
92 All the while, tighterregionalcoordinationamong British and U.S.
regulators outside of the IASC remains a thriving option.
93 Meanwhile, Britain has
opposed standardizing accounting rules at the European level. The EU has instead
pursued a policy of mutual recognition,and the European Commission has formally
given up any effort to create a European Accounting Standards body.
94 Their
strategy has been to try to in￿ uence the work of the IASC,
95 a politically more
palatable tactic than accepting USGAAP without any pretense of multilateralism.
Harmonization has been driven in this case by decentralized market forces,
primarily the desire to access the world’s most established equities markets. Firms
adjust their accounts by calculating how much they would bene￿t from a foreign
listing.Simple market power is movingharmonizationtoward the dominantcenter’s
preferred accounting approach. A multilateral accounting institution does exist, but
it does not explain harmonizationin this area. Withoutmuch active supportfrom the
United States, the IASC has provided the cover of multilateral legitimacy to mostly
U.S. standards. In doing so, the IASC has provided a focal point that bears a close
resemblance to SEC rules.
90. Ibid., 13 May 1996.
91. See the Easdaq rulebook, which is available at ^http://www.easdaq.com/pdf/rulebook.pdf& (ac-
cessed January 2000).
92. NYSE of￿ cial, interview with author, New York, N.Y., 8 November 1995.
93. U.S. standard setters, notably the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), remain deeply
skeptical of the IASC and continue to nurture the British-U.S. accounting alliance throughthe “Group of
411” countries—the United States, the United Kingdom, Australia, and Canada, plus an IASC
representative. In the view of U.S. standard setters, it is crucial to continue a dialog with this group of
“like-minded” standard setters and not to count on progress at the IASC, which is viewed as far more
likely to promulgatestretchy rules unacceptable to the United States. The strategy ofU.S. standard setters
has been to make as much progress as possible in the Group of 411 so that the Europeans are persuaded
to participate essentially on British-U.S. terms. FASB vice chairman, interview with author, Norwalk,
Conn., 15 August 1996.
94. Economist Intelligence Unit, 13 May 1996; The Financial Times [London], 6 June 1996, 29.
95. See the comments of Commissioner Mario Monti, European Commission, The Establishment of
RegionalFinancial Areas and Perspectives on RegulatoryHarmonization,presentation at the 20thAnnual
Meeting of IOSCO, Paris, 13 July 1995.
International Politics of Harmonization 611The case of standards for information sharing among securities regulators:
Low negative externalities, low incentives to emulate (quadrant 4)
As a consequence of the internationalization of securities and related derivatives
markets, advisers in one country may routinely propose a trading strategy to a
money manager in a second country that involvestaking a market positionin a third
country while offsetting it in a derivatives market in a fourth. When trading
networks cross multiple jurisdictions, regulators’ efforts to access information that
would expose fraudulent or highly risky trading activities are greatly complicated.
Information available only to foreign regulators is often essential for a national
authority to perform its functions.
To prosecutefraudulent or risky securities trading behavior, regulatorsoften need
to harmonize their rules about the release of information that may be useful for that
purpose. Clearly, however, national regulators have reasons to resist making and
honoringsuch agreements.
96 Often, concerns aboutcon￿dentialityare important.To
assess systemic risks, national regulators need to know foreign ￿ rms’ market
exposure and positions. Foreign regulators, under pressure from national ￿ rms, are
typically very cautious in providing such sensitive information. When a request
relates to illegal activities, concerns may arise about attempts to exercise extrater-
ritorial jurisdiction, especially if cooperation is being sought to prosecute a foreign
national trading from a computer screen in his or her own country. Agreements on
information sharing among regulators do not provide market incentives for emul-
ation.
Whether or not the United States is likely to experience serious negative
externalities in this issue area depends on the reasons for seeking the information.
If the purpose is to prosecute securities fraud, negative externalities may exist but
are likely to be limited. In this case the externality does not exhibit the same
potentially global character as does money laundering, nor are there the same
systemic risks posed by inadequate bank capital. When information is sought to
prosecute fraud, this issue area belongs in quadrant 4 of Figure 2.
Increasingly, however, information sharing among securities regulators is
viewed as crucial to detecting systemic risks. The collapse of Barings in 1995
did much to bolster this perception, even though no systemic consequences were
in fact felt. Information that would have exposed Barings’ dangerous aggregate
position was compartmentalized in the Singapore and Osaka exchanges and not
readily available to any single regulatory body.
97 Revelations of how little
anyone knew about Barings’ total trading position is the reason regulators have
begun to view information sharing as essential to establishing the actual risk
96. Special Counsel for International and Regulatory Affairs, Trading and Markets Division, Com-
modities and Futures Trading Commission, telephone interview with author, Washington D.C., 22
August 1996.
97. Financial Times, 19 July 1995, 7.
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98 Thus, information sharing may be necessary to
avert negative externalities of a more systemic nature. If so, this issue area may
be migrating toward quadrant 2.
In a simple fraud case, there are no incentives to emulate, but neither is the
dominant ￿ nancial center likely to experience extensive negative externalities. The
framework suggests little harmonization and a minimal role for multilateral insti-
tutions. The ￿ rst part of this expectation is not quite met here: the issue area is in
fact characterized by a series of bilateral agreements that represent a segmented
form of harmonization. The prediction for the role of multilateral institutions does
hold up. The relevant institution in this case is the International Organization of
Securities Regulators (IOSCO), a relatively passive organization whose primary
role has been to encourage regulators to negotiate and ful￿ll bilateral information-
sharing agreements. It also provides technical advice where necessary and offers
“model agreements” to interested parties.
The dominant ￿ nancial centers have proceeded bilaterally to secure understand-
ings on information sharing for quite some time. U.S. regulators have negotiated a
series of explicit bilateral information-sharing agreements, modi￿ed somewhat
depending on the circumstances, across an expanding set of dyadic regulatory
relationships. Pioneered by the SEC in 1986, these agreements typically take the
form of bilateral memoranda of understanding (MOUs). MOUs state the intentions
of the parties to make information available under certain conditions, but they are
not legally binding. A typical MOU calls on each regulator to pass on information
that may indicate a breach of the laws of the other party. A few MOUs grant mutual
authorityfor on-site inspectionsof fund managers in each other’s jurisdictions.
99 By
the end of 1997, U.S. regulators had on record with IOSCO more than ninety
bilateral MOUs and similar agreements; British regulators had forty-￿ ve; French
regulators, twenty-eight; Spanish regulators, seventeen; Italian regulators, fourteen;
and Japanese regulators, four.
100 For reasons arising from Germany’s federal
structure,German securities regulatorshave entered into such agreements onlysince
1995.
101 Of the forty-nine countries whose regulatory entities have entered into
information-sharing agreements, twenty-one made their ￿ rst agreement with their
counterpart in the United States. By the early 1990s, a number of securities
regulators in emerging markets also began to develop bilateral information-sharing
98. For an interview of Simona Locatelli, Derivatives Division of the Italian Stock Exchange Council,
see International Securities Regulation Report, 28 March 1996, 3, 13–14.
99. Such an agreement was signed by the SEC and the U.K. Investment Management Regulatory
Organization (IMRO) in May 1995. International Securities Regulation Report, 25 May 1995, 9.
100. InternationalOrganization of Securities Regulators (IOSCO) Web site. Available at ^www.iosco.
org& (accessed January 2000).
101. Prior to 1995, this was because supervision of Germany’s eight exchanges was a responsibility
of the federal states. The Bundesaugsichtsamtfu ¨r den Wertpapierhandel(BAWe) now has the authority,
but prefers to cooperate on a project-by-project basis. Georg Wittich, president, Bundesaugsichtsamt fu ¨r
den Wertpapierhandel, Germany, International Cooperation: The Exchange of Information Between
Regulators and its Development, presentation at the 20thAnnual Meeting ofIOSCO, Paris, 13 July 1995.
International Politics of Harmonization 613agreements. Securities regulators in China and Russia have now entered into such
arrangements—￿ rst and foremost with the SEC.
102
Clearly, there are some moderate externalities associated with the prosecutorial
practices in other jurisdictions, but in this case, externalities are easy to target on a
bilateral basis, and prior to the Barings case were perceived to have no important
systemic consequences. This explains the institutional response: bilateral agree-
ments are easier to negotiate than multilateral accords and minimize defection
through speci￿c reciprocity. As securities markets globalize, the incentive to
replicate information-sharing agreements increases while the transaction costs of
doing so decline (there are numerous tested “models” from which to select).
Jurisdictions that transact a high volume of business repeatedly invoke particular
bilateral arrangements, such as those between the United States and the United
Kingdom.
103 The key point here is that negative externalities are easily targeted; it
makes sense in this case to negotiate agreements that constitute bilateral “club
goods” that provide bene￿ts (mutual access to information) for members only.
Broad multilateralcooperation,particularly in the prosecutionof illegal practices, is
not as important to the dominant ￿ nancial centers as having clear agreements with
a few key regulators or exchanges.
Only recently have multilateral information-sharing agreements been made, and
as the framework presented here suggests, these aim primarily to facilitate the
detectionof systemic risks that pose potentiallyfar greater negative externalitiesfor
the dominant ￿ nancial center. In March 1996 some forty-nine exchanges and
clearinghouses (fourteen of which are in the United States), as well as fourteen
regulatory agencies, signed internationalinformation-sharingagreements that infor-
mally commit signatories to share market and ￿ nancial information about mem-
bers.
104 The expressed purpose is to allow a more comprehensiveassessment of the
intermarket risks. Thus, systemic concerns are beginning to make cooperation
among securities regulators more closely resemble that among banking regulators.
Arguably, this case migrated from the lower to the upper region of quadrant 4 after
1995, indicating that harmonization of information-sharing arrangements among
securities regulators depends on the purposes to which the information will be put.
Increasingly, these purposes involve averting potential systemic risks.
102. Russian regulators’ ￿ rst such agreement and Chinese regulators’ second (after one with Hong
Kong authorities) are with the SEC. Both concern technical cooperation, mutual assistance, and
consultation between the SEC and the Russian and Chinese counterparts. Available at ^www.iosco.org&
(accessed January 2000).
103. Special Counsel for International and Regulatory Affairs, Trading and Markets Division,
Commodities and Futures Trading Commission, telephone interview with author, Washington, D.C., 22
August 1996.
104. Japan’s national regulatory structures did not allow Japanese authorities to sign the agreement,
triggering criticisms that its national laws were hampering international cooperation. Italian regulators
signed, but the Italian stock exchanges could not because engaging in surveillance of their members is
not allowed. The MOU does,however, allow signatoriesto join the agreement at a later date, which Japan
was expected to do. See International Securities Regulation Report, 28 March 1996, 1, 8.
614 International OrganizationThe framework predicts little role for a multilateral institution in this issue area.
After all, the segmentedand targetablenature of the externalitiesarising from illegal
trades make bilateral arrangements more cost effective than broad multilateral
approaches. As expected, IOSCO has been passive; its purpose is not to enforce
MOUs or even to publicize the extent of their use or patterns of compliance. Its
innocuous role is re￿ ected in its membership, which is ridiculously broad and
practically little more than symbolic: about 95 percent of the world’s exchanges
belong.
105 In this issue area, enforcementis enhancedby bilateralism,which has the
capacity to customize obligations and make expectations explicit, thus reducing
defection, yet allows for face-saving ways to exit from an agreement. As systemic
concerns and the potential for negative externalities have increased, however, the
SEC and major U.S. exchanges have been willing to engage in multilateral
commitments to share information on ￿ rms’ trading positions.
Conclusions
Capital markets have developedso rapidly over the past two decades that regulators
have struggled to keep pace with the changing markets they supervise. Across the
regulatory spectrum, from bank supervision to securities regulation, from account-
ing requirements to anti-money laundering efforts, national authorities are ￿ nding
that the ability to achieve their objectives at a reasonable cost is in￿ uenced by the
actions (or inaction) of their counterparts in foreign jurisdictions.
Power and in￿uence in international ￿ nance are so asymmetrical that we can
understand the mechanisms of rule harmonization and the role of international
institutions in this process using a fairly simple framework. Essentially, once the
dominant ￿ nancial center initiates a regulatory innovation (which is exogenous to
the framework and is assumed to be determinedby the domesticpoliticaleconomy),
it is important to know two things: ￿ rst, whether other jurisdictions have incentives
to emulate or to resist the change; and second, whether negative externalities
experienced by the dominant center are easily targeted or diverted. The ￿ rst
condition explicitly acknowledges that foreign regulators’ utilities can be either
positively or negatively correlated with the dominant ￿ nancial center’s regulatory
innovation. If the utility of the foreign jurisdiction is positively correlated with
emulating the rules of the dominant center, harmonizing will occur. If the utility is
negatively correlated, the jurisdiction may have incentivesto implement regulations
that run counter to those in the dominant center in order to collect a premium for
offering services foreclosed by the regulatory innovation in question. Harmoniza-
tion, if it is to occur, will require mechanisms that involve the use of political
pressure, coordinated by the dominant ￿ nancial center.
105. Eduard Canadell, secretary general of IOSCO, cited in International Securities Regulation
Report, 26 October 1995, 1, 10–11.
International Politics of Harmonization 615Externalities are central to this framework because they determine whether
regulatorsin the dominantjurisdictionhave an incentiveto pressure otherregulators
to conform. Thus, they are central to assessing whether harmonization processes
￿ ow from the market or from overt political pressure by the dominant center.
Moreover, we expected weak or merely symbolic internationalinstitutionswhen the
dominant center experiences few negative externalities as a consequence of its
innovation. In this case the dominant center has little reason to invest heavily in
institutional infrastructure, and in the absence of such investments international
institutions are not likely to be central to the harmonization process.
As the applicationof the model developed,it became clear that it is also important
to know whether negative externalities imported by the ￿ nancial center are easily
targeted or diverted. When they are not, broad multilateral institutionsmay play an
important role in harmonization (subject to concerns about noncompliance when
market incentives are absent). But when they are, bilateral arrangements can be
effective without the dominant center expending resources to achieve compliance
among a broad heterogeneous membership. When there is no market incentive for
other jurisdictions to match the regulatory change in the dominant ￿ nancial market,
and this incentiveleads to choicesthat impart negativeexternalitiesto the dominant
center, international institutions are not only likely to be multilateral. They are
expected to perform important surveillance and sanctioning functions as well.
This simple framework explains reasonably well the mechanisms through which
harmonizationoccurs and the role, if any, played by internationalinstitutionsin this
process. It explains, for example, why a surprising number of national banking
supervisors have been willing to adopt the capital adequacy standards in the Basel
Accord: in an uncertain and asymmetrical information environment markets virtu-
ally demand it as an indicator of a “well-regulated” jurisdiction. The dominant
￿ nancial centers support the role of the BIS to disseminate information and provide
technical assistance about these standards.
The framework also explains why harmonization of anti-money laundering rules
has been a slow, partial, painful, and highly politicized process. Emulation in this
issue area is costly, yet the United States is determined to address crime at home by
enlisting often reluctant foreign jurisdictionsto help ensure that crime does not pay.
The United Stateshas been central to the creationof an institution—the FATF—that
can pass judgment on and sanction both members and nonmembers.
The case of accountingstandards for public offerings providesa good example of
incentives to emulate and low negative externalities for the United States. Predict-
ably, market forces have fueled harmonization, and the efforts of the IASC have
largely served to provide internationallegitimationfor standards very close to those
insisted on by the SEC.
The most uncomfortable ￿ t for the framework is explaining the outcome for
information-sharing rules among securities regulators. In retrospect, I probably
underestimatedthe externalitiesassociated with foreign regulators’ unwillingnessto
cooperate in prosecutions of fraud by providing essential information to the SEC.
While limited, the externalities are not likely to be zero. Moreover, U.S. regulators
616 International Organizationhave found a relatively low-cost way to address what is essentially a private
negative externality: strike a series of informal bilateral deals with the most
signi￿cant jurisdictions and rely on speci￿c reciprocity for enforcement. Increas-
ingly, as information sharing has been needed to assess systemic risks with broader
indivisiblenegativeexternalities,agreementshave become more multilateralin their
scope and more institutionalized in their provisions, as the framework would
predict.
The attractiveness of this framework in explaining regulatory harmonization
generally will depend on its ability to “travel” convincinglyto other issue areas. The
strong asymmetry among ￿ nancial jurisdictions may at ￿ rst seem somewhat inap-
propriate for other issues, such as environmental or labor regulations. Yet on closer
examination it may not be inappropriate. The dominance of the ￿ nancial center in
this framework serves to remind us that large jurisdictions take actions that
correspond to their nationally determined preferences, and that these regulatory
choices are not likely to be retracted simply because other jurisdictions have not
chosen to emulate. It seems reasonable to assume that asymmetries are signi￿cant
enough in a number of other areas to warrant such an assumption. Across a range
of regulatory cases it should be possible, in principle, to assess whether the choices
made by a dominant jurisdiction provide incentives to others for emulating or
divergingor make no difference at all. Furthermore, whether or not the externalities
are strongly negative enough for the dominant jurisdiction to respond with political
pressure seems to transfer readily to other regulatory domains. The real dif￿culty in
applying this approach is the dif￿culty inherent in specifying in advance just how
costly a negative externality is likely to be in any given issue area. How, for
example, can one rigorously quantify the (potential) externality imposed on the
United States if other jurisdictions do not follow Basel standards of prudential
banking supervision? Economists might be able to offer a theoretical response
having to do with the cost of returning to the status quo, but actually measuring
externalities will often be extremely complex.
Nonetheless, the framework offered here suggests two crucial dimensions within
which we can understand the mechanisms behind observed regulatory harmoniza-
tion. The ￿ rst dimension comprises the incentives smaller jurisdictions have to
emulate changes made by regulators in major markets. These incentives vary by
issue area, as the research presented here reveals. This variability is one reason
competitive races to the bottom occur with less frequency than some analysts
expect: powerful market players often prefer standards that, in some cases, give
foreign regulators a market incentive to match rather than to undercut. The second
important dimension comprises the nature and extent of externalities that affect a
dominantjurisdiction.When externalitiesare signi￿cant, the dominantactor can use
unilateral political coercion to press for harmonization or can shape the role and
strength of international institutions to mitigate “public” negative externalities and
to enforce cooperativebehavior.Neoliberal institutionalismto date has not provided
a convincing explanation for the kinds of institutional variations this framework
addresses. Moreover, analyses inspired by liberal functionalist approaches have
International Politics of Harmonization 617playeddown importantdifferences between market pressures and politicalpressures
to harmonize policies and have emphasized joint gains while submerging the more
coercive aspects of “cooperative” arrangements. This framework provides a way to
analyze systematically the incentives of both the dominant jurisdiction and less
powerful but potentiallysigni￿cant producers of externalitieselsewhere. As such, it
helps to make sense of a bewildering array of agreements, institutional arrange-
ments, and unilateral practices designed to address the problems posed by rapidly
changing international capital markets.
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